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Eytan Sheshinsky. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A large fraction of European citizens leaving in countries with a traditionally
strong pay-as-you-go system now perceives that their social security ben-
eﬁts will not be suﬃcient to maintain their life-style after retirement. As
a consequence, there is a growing demand for individual long-term savings
plans that would be speciﬁcally designed for ﬁnancing consumption after re-
tirement. This phenomenon raises an interesting new decision problem for
european consumers who used to save mostly for the short run. With these
emerging markets, the typical time horizon for the planned consumers’ in-
vestment can now be as large as 40 years. For such time horizons, the impact
of the investment strategy on ﬁnal wealth is enormous. Selecting this strat-
egy is thus an important challenge for these consumers and their ﬁnancial
advisors.
During the XXth century in the U.S., the real return on bonds has been
1% per year, whereas investing in stocks generated an expected return of
7%. Thus, a young worker investing 100 at the age of 25 would obtain a
pension wealth at the age of 65 equaling 149 if she has been 100% invested
in bonds. This pension wealth would equal 1497 on average if she would
have invested everything in stocks. The equity premium puzzle is magniﬁed
by the exponential nature of compounded interests of long-term investors.
Thus, the temptation is large for young households to take advantage of the
large equity premium by investing a large fraction of their pension plan on
the stocks market. This is in fact one of the arguments usually presented to
move from a dominant PAYG system towards a more funded system. The
problem, however, is that not only the expected beneﬁto ft h i ss t r a t e g y ,b u t
also the associated risk on the ﬁnal pension wealth, are proportional to the
time horizon of the investor. Investing in stocks for one year entails some risk,
but investing in stocks for 40 years is 40 times riskier (if risk is measured by
the standard deviation of ﬁnal wealth, assuming no serial correlation of stock
returns)! Thus, it is not clear a priori that younger investors should take more
risk.
The problem implicit in dynamic portfolio choices is to determine how fu-
ture investment opportunities aﬀect instantaneous investment choices. Pop-
ular treatments suggest that short time horizons often lead to excessively
conservative strategies. Samuelson (1989) and several others have asked:
“As you grow older and your investment horizon shortens, should you cut
1down your exposure to lucrative but risky equities?” Conventional wisdom
answers aﬃrmatively, stating that long-horizon investors can tolerate more
r i s kb e c a u s et h e yh a v em o r et i m et or e c o u pt r a n s i e n tl o s s e s . T h i sd i c t u m
has not received the backing of scientiﬁc theory, however. As Samuelson
(1963, 1989) in particular poin t so u t ,t h i s“ t i m e - d i v e r s i ﬁcation” argument
relies on a fallacious interpretation of the Law of Large Numbers: repeating
an investment pattern over many periods does not cause risk to wash out in
the long run. This fallacy is illustrated by the following question raised by
Samuelson (1963): ”I oﬀered some lunch colleagues to bet each $200 to $100
that the side of a coin they speciﬁed would not appear at the ﬁrst toss. One
distinguished scholar (...) gave the following answer: I won’t bet because I
would feel the $100 loss more than the $200 gain. But I’ll take you on if you
promise to let me make 100 such bets”. This story suggests that independent
risks are complementary. However, Samuelson went ahead and asked why it
would be optimal to accept 100 separately undesirable bets. The scholar
answered: ”One toss is not enough to make it reasonably sure that the law
of averages will turn out in my favor. But in a hundred tosses of a coin, the
law of large numbers will make it a darn good bet.”
Obviously, this scholar misinterprets the Law of Large Numbers! It is
not by accepting a second independent lottery that one reduces the risk
associated with the ﬁrst one. If e x1, e x2,..., e xn are independent and identically
distributed random wealth variables, e x1+ e x2+...+ e xn has a variance n times
as large as the variance of each of these risks. What is stated by the Law
of Large Numbers is that 1
n
Pn
i=1 e xi –n o t
Pn
i=1 e xi – tends to Ee x1 almost
surely as n tends to inﬁnity. It is by subdividing – not adding – risks that
they are washed away by diversiﬁcation.
Table 1 provides some information about how U.S. consumers link their
optimal pension portfolio to their age. It describes actual portfolio compo-
sitions of individual TIAA-CREF plans, as observed in June 2000. A clear
pattern appears in this table: consumers tend to follow the recommandation
to rebalance their portfolio in favor of safer assets when growing older.
In this paper, we show that there exist some convincing arguments sus-
taining the common wisdom that agents with a longer time horizon should
take more risk. The next two sections present the benchmark model where an
investor facing unpredictable ﬁnancial markets invests at young age a speciﬁc
amount to ﬁnance his consumption in n years from now. We explain why
the optimal portfolio is independent of n in that case. In section 4, we show
2that the optimal portfolio risk is increasing in n if the agent can compensate
early ﬁnancial losses by saving more during her career. We take into ac-
count of the riskiness of human capital and of the ﬂexibility of labour supply
respectively in sections 5 and 6. Section 7 is devoted to a short introduction
to the eﬀect of predictable returns (mean-reversion, stochastic volatility and
Bayesian learning) on the dynamic portfolio strategy.
Allocation Pattern\Age Under 35 35-44 45-54 Above 55
100% Equity 34.9 32.6 30.1 28.1
75.1%-99.9% Equity 17.1 13.8 10.3 6.6
50.1%-75% Equity 19.5 20.4 19.5 17.2
Table1: Portfolio composition as a function of age.
(Sources: TIAA-CREF Institute Research (2000), and TIAA-CREF
Actuarial Technical (1986))
2 The initial building block: Optimal static
portfolios
Let us start the analysis by assuming that the consumer is close to retire and
to liquidate her portfolio. The consumer’s current wealth on her individual
pension account is w0. The consumer’s immediate problem is to determine
the portfolio of ﬁnancial assets that maximizes the expected utility of her
accumulated pension wealth at the end of the period. Because of the short
time remaining before the liquidation of the portfolio, this decision problem
is essentially static. Assuming a complete set of Arrow-Debreu assets, this








Πscs = w0, (1)
where s =1 ,...,S is an index for the S p o s s i b l es t a t e so fn a t u r et h a tc o u l d
prevail at the retirement date, ps is the objective probability of state s, Πs
is the price of the Arrow-Debreu security associated to that state, and cs
is the number of Arrow-Debreu securities s that are purchased. Because
cs is also the pension wealth of the agent at the end of the period, u(cs)
is the utility that the retiree extracts from consuming this wealth over her
3remaining lifetime. We assume that u is increasing and concave. The degree
of tolerance to risk on retirement wealth is measured by T(c)=−u0(c)/u00(c).
The budget constraint in (1) just states that the accumulated pension wealth
z at the beginning of the period is used to purchase portfolio (c1,...,cS)o f
Arrow-Debreu securities.
Observe that we do not restrict the investment opportunity set in any
way. This means that households are allowed to invest in stocks, bonds, but
also in real estate, portfolio insurance, options and other exotic assets. Our
aim is to describe the unconstrained optimum. There are several reasons
why regulators could want to restrict portfolio choices, for example because
of the implicit portfolio insurance that the State would probably provide if
a ﬁnancial krach would bring future (risk-loving) retirees into poverty. Con-
straining individual portfolio choices may be good to ﬁght the moral hazard
problem associated to this implicit solidarity mechanism, but it introduces
ineﬃciencies in the allocation of risk in the economy. The optimal portfolio
management when upper limits to the portfolio risk are imposed is a diﬃcult
question that will not be examined in this paper.1
The ﬁrst-order condition of program (1) can be written as cs = C(Πs/ps)
where function C satisﬁes
u
0(C(π)) = ξπ, (2)
with ξ denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint.
Observe that the demand for the Arrow-Debreu security s is only a function
of πs = Πs/ps, the state price per unit of probability. Obviously, C is non-
increasing in π : risk-averse investors accept to have a smaller ﬁnal wealth
level in more expensive states. The riskiness of the optimal portfolio can be
measured by how the riskiness of asset returns — which can be measured by
the variability of πs = Πs/ps — is transferred to riskiness of ﬁnal wealth. The
absolute value of the derivative of C with respect to π does exactly that.






This means that more risk-tolerant agents purchase a riskier portfolio. In
the remainder of the paper, we examine how the riskiness of the optimal
portfolio is aﬀected by the age of the consumer.
1For more details on this question, see for example Grossman and Vila (1992).
43 Merton’s result: Age is irrelevant
In this section, we determine the optimal dynamic portfolio strategy of a
younger consumer. This consumer with current pension wealth w0 has n
periods to go before liquidating her personal pension plan. Thus, contrary
to what we assumed in the previous section, she does not consume the value
of the portfolio at the end of the ﬁrst period. Rather, she will reinvest the
accumulated capital in an asset portfolio for another n − 1p e r i o d s .W ea r e
interested in determining how these future investment opportunities aﬀect
the attitude of the young consumer towards the current portfolio risk. To
solve this problem, we use backward induction.
We assume that the investment opportunity set in each period t is not
contingent to the past history. The investment opportunity set at each date
is thus fully characterized by the vector of Arrow-Debreu prices (Π1,...,ΠS).
Assuming that this vector is independent of past events means that future
asset prices are unpredictable: there is no mean-reversion, no learning and no
stochastic volatility in asset returns. Under this assumption, the only state
variable of the dynamic problem is the accumulated wealth z at the decision
date under scrutiny. Given z at date t, the consumer selects the portfolio to
hold until the next date that maximizes the expected value of his pension
wealth at date t +1 :







Πscs = z, (4)
We ﬁrst solve this problem for t = n − 1, i.e., when the agent has only
one period to go before retirement. Because vn(c)=u(c)b yd e ﬁnition, this
portfolio problem is formally equivalent to the static portfolio problem that
we examined in the previous section. We can thus interpret vn−1(z)a st h e
optimal expected utility of ﬁnal pension wealth conditional to accumulating
pension wealth z one period before retirement age. Using this function, we
can go one date backward to ﬁnd value function vn−2 , and so on.
To determine the impact of age on the optimal portfolio, we need to
compare the solutions of program (4) for the various date t from 1 to n.
Observe that the only diﬀerence between these diﬀerent programs comes from
the transformation of the value function from vt to vτ. As explained in the
previous section, an agent with age t should accept more portfolio risk than
5an agent with age τ >tif and only if the value function vt exhibits more risk











s=1 Πscs = z










Tvn−1 is the degree of tolerance to portfolio risk of the agent with two periods
to go before retirement. Suppose that the agent has a power utility function
u(c)=c1−γ/(1 − γ), which implies that absolute risk tolerance T(c)=c/γ
is proportional to retirement consumption c. Using the budget constraint,
equation (5) is then rewritten as Tvn−1(z)=T(z). By backward induction,
Tvt(z)=T(z) for all t =1 ,...,n : the degrees of risk-tolerance of the value
functions and of the utility function are identical. This means that the at-
titude towards portfolio risk is independent of age. Age, or the investment
time-horizon, is irrelevant for determining the optimal structure of the pen-
sion portfolio. Here, myopia is optimal in the sense that the best investment
strategy is obtained by assuming in each period that this is the last period
before retirement. This result has been independently discovered by Mossin
(1968), Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969).
Proposition 1 Consider the dynamic investment problem with constant rel-
ative risk aversion and unpredictable asset returns. In such a situation, the
optimal portfolio structure is independent of age.
Mossin (1968) observed that power utility functions are the only functions
with such a nice property. This is easily seen from property (5) by using
Jensen’s inequality when T is either concave or convex, or when T(0) 6=0 , as
explained in Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002). However, it can be shown that
the non-proportionality of the absolute risk tolerance has only a marginal
eﬀect on the optimal portfolio of young investors.
This model relies on the assumption of frictionless ﬁnancial markets. In
particular, we assumed above the absence of any transaction cost and bid-ask
6spread. This is obviously unrealistic. Taking into account of these frictions
implies that it may be optimal not to rebalance the portfolio in case of limited
capital gains or losses. But their eﬀect on the optimal portfolio at young age
is ambiguous. Frictions on the housing market also have ambiguous eﬀect of
the age structure of optimal portfolios.
4 Human capital and ﬂexible contributions
to the pension plan
The previous dynamic portfolio problem isolated the problem of ﬁnancing
consumption after retirement from the other sources of needs, incomes and
risks faced by the consumer in her entire lifetime. In this section, we introduce
intermediary consumption and labour incomes in the model. Suppose that
the agent has n consumption dates t =1 ,...,nto go before retirement. Her
ﬂow of labour incomes is denoted (y1,...,yn) and is assumed to be risk-free
at this stage of the analysis. Let β denote the psychological discount factor
of the agent, and r is the risk-free rate.
Consider ﬁr s tap e n s i o np l a ni nw h i c ht h ea g e n tm u s tc o m m i th e r s e l fo n
the ﬂow of her contributions (s1,s 2,...,sn) until retirement. This is equivalent






at date t =1 . Given that initial pension wealth w0, the problem of the
optimal dynamic portfolio management is not diﬀerent to the one that we
examined in the previous section. In particular, if relative risk aversion is
constant, myopia is optimal: if two agents have the same current pension
wealth w0, they should hold the same portfolio even if they don’t have the
same age. The optimal portfolio risk is proportional to T(w0).
Consider alternatively a pension plan with fully ﬂexible contributions
over time. At each date t before retirement, the agent decides how much
to contribute to the plan and how to invest the pension wealth on ﬁnancial
markets. This dynamic consumption-portfolio problem is written as








Πscs = z + s. (6)
7From current labour income yt at date t, the agent decides to save s and
to consume the remaining yt − s at that date. Saving s is added to the
past accumulated wealth z, and everything is optimally invested on ﬁnancial
markets. As before, we ﬁrst solve this problem for t = n − 1, using the
fact that hn ≡ u. Solving this problem yields the optimal saving strategy
s0 and the optimal portfolio strategy (c1,...,cS) for that date. It also yields
the maximum discounted expected utility hn−1 that is used to solve the
consumption-portfolio problem for date n − 2.






where c0 = yt−s is optimal consumption. Assuming again that relative risk
aversion is constant and using the budget constraint, this implies that
Thn−1(z)=T(z +( 1+r)
−1yn),
where by deﬁnition (1 + r)−1 =
P
Πs. By backward induction, we obtain
that





is the NPV of future labour income, i.e., the human capital at date t.B e c a u s e
Yt is decreasing in t, the degree of risk tolerance of the agent goes down
when she grows older. Thus, in a ﬂexible contribution plans, agents should
rebalance their portfolio in favor of the risk-free asset when they are close to
retire. Notice also that, because the agent starts initially with a zero pension
wealth z =0 , the optimal portfolio risk at young age with this fully ﬂexible
pension plan is proportional to Th0(0) = T(Y0). Thus, when we allow for
ﬂexible contributions, the portfolio risk is proportional to T(Y0)w h e r e a si ti s
proportional to T(w0)=( w0/Y0)T(Y0) in the rigid case. Because the NPV
w0 of the ﬂow of contributions in the rigid plan must be smaller that the
NPV Y0 of the ﬂow of labour incomes, we proved the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Suppose constant relative risk aversion. When the contri-
butions to the pension plan is predetermined, the optimal portfolio risk is
independent of age, whereas it is decreasing with age when contributions are
ﬂexible. Moreover, the optimal portfolio riskiness at young age is increased
8by a factor Y0/w0 if we allow for the contributions to the pension plan to be
ﬂexible compared to the rigid case, where w0 is the net present value of the
contributions in the rigid plan, and Y0 is the human capital of the agent.
A crude estimation of Y0/w0 is around 10, which means that the ﬂexible
plan should invest 10 times more in risky assets than if the plan has a pre-
established and rigid ﬂow of contributions. As explained in Gollier (2002),
the intuition for such a powerful eﬀect is the ability of the ﬂexible plan to
”time-diversify” shocks on pension wealth by splitting it into small shocks
on consumption over the remaining lifetime. Of course, this eﬀect goes down
as the time-horizon shortens, which yields a strong negative age eﬀect on the
optimal portfolio risk.
5 Uncertain human capital
Up to now, we assumed that the only source of uncertainty comes from the
households’ ﬁnancial investments. For the sake of realism, we need to take
into account of the fact that the ﬂow of labour incomes is also uncertain:
young workers can face much uncertainty about the value of their human
capital. In the same vein, future promotions and unemployment spells are
uncertain. The uncertainty aﬀecting human capital is expected to aﬀect both
the optimal wealth accumulation and the optimal structure of the pension
portfolio. It is well-known since Leland (1968) and Dr` eze and Modigliani
(1972) that prudent consumers will save more when their future incomes be-
come riskier in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Gollier and Pratt
(1996) showed that risk-vulnerable consumers are more averse to portfolio
risk when they bear an independent risk on their human capital. The con-
cepts of prudence and risk vulnerability are related respectively to the third
and fourth derivatives of the utility function. Consumers with constant rela-
tive risk aversion are both prudent and risk-vulnerable. Thus, under CRRA,
the uncertainty aﬀecting human capital raises the accumulation of ﬁnancial
wealth and it reduces the share of this wealth invested in risky assets.
How does the uncertainty of human capital aﬀect the relationship between
age and the optimal portfolio structure? Because younger households face
more uncertainty on their human capital, they should select a safer portfolio.
This argument is particularly relevant when households are likely to face a
9liquidity constraint. The households’ unability to borrow in order to ﬁnance
consumption in periods of low labour incomes magniﬁes the riskiness of hu-
man capital. To sum up, age horizon has two contradictory eﬀects on the
optimal portfolio. As stated in Proposition 2, younger households can better
diversify their portfolio risk, which implies that they should take more port-
folio risk. On the contrary, younger agents face more uncertainty on their
human capital, which implies that they should select a safer portfolio. Which
of these two eﬀects dominates the other depends upon the intensity of the
risk on human capital.
Including an uninsurable background risk together with a liquidity con-
straint to the dynamic consumption-portfolio problem makes it unsolvable
analytically. In the following calibration exercise, we consider an agent with
constant relative risk aversion γ =1 0 . Both the risk-free rate and the rate of
pure preference for the present are assumed to be zero. There is only one risky
asset which has an excess return of 7% per year and a standard deviation
of 12%. We assume that the worker has 15 years to live when he retires. At
the exogenous retirement age, the pension wealth is invested in the risk-free
asset to ﬁnance consumption over the remaining lifetime. Before retirement,
the agent faces an unemployment risk which takes the following form: when
he is unemployed, his yearly labour income is normalized to unity, whereas
unemployment beneﬁts equal only 50% of that labour incomes. When em-
ployed in year t, the agent faces the risk to become unemployed in year t+1.
This happens with probability 5%. On the contrary, if unemployed in year
t,t h ea g e n tﬁn d san e wj o bi ny e a rt + 1 with probability 0.5. In Figure 1,
we draw the optimal investment in the risky asset as a function of ﬁnancial
wealth z,f o rd i ﬀerent time horizons when the agent is employed.
When the agent has accumulated a large pension wealth, the riskiness
of the optimal portfolio is decreasing with age, as stated in Proposition 2.
But when ﬁnancial reserves are small, the riskiness of the optimal portfolio
is increasing with age. Because of the inability of young households to time-
diversify their unemployment risk, a safer portfolio is optimal. When they
grow older, this risk on human capital becomes smaller, and they should
rebalance their portfolio in favor of the risky asset, until the limited ability
of old consumers to time-diversify their portfolio risk becomes the dominant
factor. In this calibration, the eﬀect of age on the demand for the risky asset
is ceteris paribus ﬁrst increasing, and then decreasing.






Last year before retirement
30 years before retirement
Figure 1: The optimal investment in stock (in the employment state) as a
function of current ﬁnancial wealth, for diﬀerent time horizons.
6 Flexible labour supply
Another unpleasant aspect of the benchmark dynamic model presented in
section 4 comes from the assumption that households have no control of
their labour supply. In particular, workers cannot compensate their ﬁnancial
l o s s e so nt h ep e n s i o nw e a l t hb yw o r k i n gm o r e .B o d i e ,M e r t o na n dS a m u e l s o n
(1992) examined the eﬀect of a ﬂexible labour supply on the optimal dynamic
portfolio strategy. We can extend the benchmark model (6) to endogeneize
labour decision. Suppose that the agent has one unit of time per period to
allocate between leisure L and labour 1 − L. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that the wage per unit of working time equals y, which is constant
over time. Let b u(c,L) denote the felicity of the agent who consumes a share
L of leisure and who consumes c = y(1 − L) − s of the consumption good,
where s denotes savings. As usual, we assume that b u is concave in (c,L).
The decision problem of the household with accumulated wealth z at date t
11can then be written as










Notice that we assume here that there is full ﬂexibility in the sense that
workers can reduce or reduce their working time at any time, and at their
best convenience. In particular, the agent is here assumed to fully control
his/her age of retirement. It is noteworthy that the above problem is strictly
equivalent to problem (6) where function u would be deﬁned as follows:
u(c)=m a x
L
b u(c − yL,L). (9)






b u11(c − yL∗,L ∗)
b u1(c − yL∗,L ∗)
+
[yb u11(c − yL∗,L ∗) − b u12(c − yL∗,L ∗)]
2
y2b u11(c − yL∗,L ∗) − 2yb u12(c − yL∗,L ∗)+b u22(c − yL∗,L ∗)
.
(10)
Observe that the second term of the right-hand side of the above equal-
ity is negative because of the concavity of b u.O b s e r v e a l s o t h a t −b u11(c −
yL∗,L ∗)/b u1(c − yL∗,L ∗) is the absolute of risk aversion of a worker who
rigidly supplies labour L∗. These observations yield the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 3 Consider two agents with the same utility function b u on con-
sumption and leisure. Let L∗ denote the optimal consumption given wage y
and income c. The agent who can adapt his labour supply to changes in in-






b u11(c − yL∗,L ∗)
b u1(c − yL∗,L ∗)
.
Notice that the nature of the dynamic portfolio problem is not trans-
formed by this form of labour ﬂexibility. Labour ﬂexibility just reduces the
concavity of the utility function u in program (6). In particular, if the in-
direct utility function u exhibits constant relative risk aversion, the optimal
portfolio structure is independent of age when contributions to the pension
12plan are pre-established. The only eﬀect of the ﬂexible labour market is to
raise the share of the households’ wealth invested in stocks, at all ages.
The message will not be the same if we suppose alternatively that the
ﬂexibility of labour supply is limited to the decision on the age of (partial)
retirement. In that case, only the risk aversion (−u00/u0) at old age is reduced,
whereas risk aversion (−b u11/b u1) when retirement is not allowed remains large.
This implies that the degree of risk aversion of the value function is reduced
for older households, yielding a riskier optimal portfolio.
7 Predictable asset returns
The absence of any predictability in asset returns has long been considered
as a dogma in the theory of ﬁnance. Several empirical ﬁndings have reversed
this idea over the last two decades. For example, Barberis (2000) estimates
signiﬁcant mean-reversion in U.S. stock returns: a high return of the risky
portfolio in period t implies a lower expected portfolio return period t +1 .
Because mean-reversion implies that stocks are safer in the long run, the
intuition suggests that a long horizon agent should have a positive ”hedging
demand” for risk in the initial stage of the game. Kim and Omberg (1996)
and Kogan and Uppal (2000) showed that this is indeed the case if constant
relative risk aversion is larger than unity. Campbell and Viceira (1999)
and Barberis (2000) have shown that the hedging demand for stocks is sur-
prisingly large. For an agent with a relative risk aversion equaling 10 and a
ten-year time horizon, the optimal investment in stocks is about 40% of cur-
rent wealth without predictability. It goes up to 100% when mean-reversion
is taken into account.
Predictability also arises from random time-varying volatility of stock
returns. There is ample evidence that large negative returns tend to be asso-
ciated with increases in volatility over long periods of time (see for example
Ghysels, Harvey and Renault (1996)). Chacko and Viceira (2000) show that
long-term investors with a constant relative risk aversion larger than unity
should reduce their demand for stocks in that environment.
Predictability is an important element to take into account to discuss the
age proﬁle of optimal portfolios. For investors who are close to retire, the
existence of predictable future returns is irrelevant for their portfolio decision,
since they will be out of the market when those changes will occur. On the
13contrary, households with a longer time horizon should take into account of
those future changes in their current choices. For example, we can infer from
Barberis (2000) that the existence of mean-reversion in U.S. stocks returns
multiplies the demand for stocks from investors with a ten-year time-horizon
by a factor larger than 2 when compared to the stocks demand from investors
with only one year to go before retirement.
The predictability of asset returns is linked to changes in the investment
o p p o r t u n i t ys e to v e rt i m e .A s s e tr e t u r n sa r es o m e w h a tp r e d i c t a b l ei ft h e s e
stochastic changes are correlated to an observable variable. In the cases of
mean-reversion and stochastic volatility, this observable variable is the vector
of past returns. More generally, when this observable variable is correlated
to past returns, investors should insure against undesirable future changes
in the investment opportunity set by investing more in assets which perform
well when the opportunity set deteriorates. This is the hedging demand
for stocks. For example, in the case of mean-reversion of stock returns, the
fact that stock returns are high when the investment opportunity set dete-
riorates induces a positive hedging demand for stocks. On the contrary, in
the case of stochastic volatility, the investment opportunity set is improved
(stocks become less risky) when returns are high. This implies a negative
hedging demand for stocks. This eﬀect is small compared to the eﬀect of
mean-reversion, which implies that younger households should invest more
in stocks.
In our benchmark model (4), the investment opportunity set at date t
is characterized by the vector (Π1,...,ΠS) of the prices of the Arrow-Debreu
securities. Because we assumed this vector to be stable over time, our model
had no predictability in asset returns. Suppose alternatively that the vector
of state prices at the beginning of the last period before retirement depends
upon the state of nature sn−1 that prevailed one period earlier. In the ab-
sence of intermediary consumption, the portfolio problem at that date can
be written as







Πs(sn−1)cs = z. (11)
The value function vn−1 has now a second state variable, which is past history




















It is easy to check that any change in history that yields a mean-preserving
spread in the distribution of Π/p makes the agent better oﬀ, i.e., raises vn−1.
Observe that this means that such a change in the investment opportunity
set reduces Kn−1 if relative risk aversion is larger than unity. When γ is less
than one, a MPS in Π/p raises Kn−1. Gollier (2004) shows that an increase
in the equity premium or a reduction in the volatility of equity returns yield
such a mean-preserving spread in state prices.
W ea r ei n t e r e s t e di nd e t e r m i n i n gt h ee ﬀect of predictability on the optimal
portfolio two periods before retirement. The optimal demand for the AD
security associated to state s at date t = n−2 is determined by the marginal









Suppose that the return of equity is low in state s, which means that Πs/ps
is large. First-order condition (13) implies that the demand cs for that AD
security is negatively aﬀected by this high price (negative substitution ef-
fect). But suppose that this expensive state in period n−2 is associated to a
mean-preserving spread in state prices in period n,a si st h ec a s ew i t hm e a n -
reversion. When γ is larger than unity, we know from (12) that it yields a
reduction in Kn−1. This reduction yields a negative hedging demand for that
AD security, thereby reinforcing the substitution eﬀect. Symmetrically, the
demand for AD securities associated to cheap states has a positive substi-
tution eﬀect, and a positive reinforcing hedging eﬀect. Ex-ante, the optimal
portfolio in period n−2 is made riskier due to the presence of mean-reversion.
Proposition 4 Consider the dynamic investment problem with constant rel-
ative risk aversion larger than unity and with mean-reversion in equity re-
turns. In such a situation, younger households should purchase riskier port-
folios.
Observe however that this recommendation is reversed for households
with a constant relative risk aversion smaller than unity. This is because
15mean-preserving spreads in Π/p raises the marginal value of wealth in spite
of the fact that these changes are desirable. Gollier (2004) generalizes this
result to utility functions without constant relative risk aversion.
As observed by Chacko and Viceira (2000), the fact that a drop in stock
returns is generally followed by an increase in stock return volatility (i.e.,
a mean-preserving contraction in state prices Π/p) generates an eﬀect on
dynamic portfolio management which is exactly opposite to the one pre-
sented in Proposition 4. Contrary to mean-reversion where bad news on
instantaneous returns is good news for the future investment opportunity
set, stochastic volatility means that bad news on instantaneous returns is
bad news for the future. Thus, stochastic volatility combined with a con-
stant relative risk aversion larger than unity implies that younger investors
should select safer portfolios.
In all these models, we assumed that investors know the distribution of
stocks returns. Various authors since Detemple (1986) and Gennotte (1986)
have argued that young investors may face considerable uncertainty about it.
As investors grow older, they observe stock returns, and they update their
beliefs by using Bayes’ rule. How does this parameter uncertainty aﬀect the
optimal dynamic portfolio strategy? To answer this question, notice that a
good news on instantaneous returns is also a good news for the future invest-
ment opportunity set, since Bayesian investors will update their beliefs in a
more optimistic way after observing a large instantaneous return. Thus, as
for stochastic volatility, we are in a situation opposite to the one presented in
Proposition 4. As shown in Gollier (2004) who provides a complete typology
of predictability models, Bayesian learning on an uncertain equity premium
implies that younger investors should select safer portfolios when absolute
prudence −u000/u00 is smaller than twice the absolute risk aversion. Under
constant relative risk aversion, this is equivalent to γ being larger than unity.
8C o n c l u s i o n
Should younger households invest more in risky assets? To answer this ques-
tion, we ﬁrst considered a simple model where households who save exclu-
sively for their retirement do not control their contribution to their pension
plan. In this benchmark model, we also assumed that assets returns are un-
predictable, and that households have no ﬂexibility in their labour supply.
16Following the seminal contributions of Mossin (1968), Merton (1969) and
Samuelson (1969), we showed that investors with a constant relative risk
aversion should select a portfolio structure which is independent of their age.
From this benchmark result, we provided two arguments in favor of a
negative eﬀect of age on the portfolio riskiness. The most convincing one
relaxes the constraint that investors cannot adapt their contributions to their
individual pension plan to shocks on their pension wealth. In reality, young
households anticipate that they will save more during their career if their
pension plan do not perform well, and that they will save less if their early
portfolio return is large. This time diversiﬁcation of the risk on pension wealth
provides a strong incentive to invest more aggressively on the stocks market
at young age. The second argument in favor of this recommendation comes
from the observation that there is some mean-reversion in stocks returns. This
implies that young investors face a long-term portfolio risk that is relatively
smaller than in the unpredictable case. We showed that young investors with
a relative risk aversion larger than unity should take into account of this
observation by investing more in stocks. These two eﬀects are large. The
ﬁrst tends to multiply the demand for stocks from young investors by a
factor 10, whereas mean-reversion tends to multiply it by a factor 2.
However, there also exist various arguments going in the opposite direc-
tion. First, one should take into account of the fact that the return of human
capital is highly uncertain for most young households. If they cannot time-
diversify this risk because of liquidity constraints for example, these young
households should select a safer portfolio. The fact that younger investors
face some uncertainty on the true distribution of the equity premium pro-
vides another argument in favor of their selection of a safer portfolio. Finally,
the fact that the volatility of equity returns is increased after a krach also
tends to reduce the optimal risk exposure of long-term investors.
The fact that households can react to shocks on their pension wealth by
adapting their labour supply has no clear eﬀect on the age proﬁle of optimal
portfolios. If the ﬂexibility of labour supply is the same at all ages, the only
eﬀect of this ﬂexibility is to raise the demand for stocks at all age. On the
contrary, if the labour ﬂexibility is limited to the decision on the retirement
age, then this provides an incentive for older workers to invest more in risky
assets.
The bottom line of the analysis is that there is no universal answer to the
question of whether younger households should be less risk-averse. Its answer
17depends upon individual characteristics such as for example the riskiness of
the household’s human capital, the intensity of potential liquidity constraints
faced by it, the degree of ﬂexibility of the household’s labour supply, or the
quality of the household’s knowledge of the functioning of ﬁnancial markets.
Calibration exercises seem to favor a share of wealth invested in stocks that
is decreasing with age.
18References
Barberis, N., (2000), Investing for the long run when returns are
predictable, Journal of Finance, 55, 225-64.
Bodie, Z., R.C. Merton and W.F. Samuelson, (1992), Labor sup-
ply ﬂexibility and portfolio choice in a life cycle model, Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16, 427-449.
Campbell, J., and L. Viceira, (1999), Consumption and portfolio
decisions when expected returns are time varying, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 114, 433-95.
Chacko, G., and L.M. Viceira, (2000), Dynamic consumption and
portfolio choice with stochastic volatility in incomplete mar-
kets, Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming.
Detemple, J.B., (1986), Asset pricing in an economy with incom-
plete information, Journal of Finance, 61, 383-392.
Dr` eze, J.H. and F. Modigliani, (1972), Consumption decisions
under uncertainty, Journal of Economic Theory, 5, 308-335.
Gennotte, G., (1986), Optimal portfolio choice under incomplete
information, Journal of Finance, 41, 733-749.
Gollier, C. and J.W. Pratt, (1996), Risk vulnerability and the
tempering eﬀect of background risk, Econometrica, 64, 1109-
1124.
Gollier, C., (2002), Time diversiﬁcation, liquidity constraints, and
decreasing aversion to risk on wealth, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 49, 1439-1459.
Gollier, C. and R.J. Zeckhauser, (2002), Horizon Length and
Portfolio Risk, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,2 4( 3 ) ,1 9 5 -
212.
Gollier, C., (2004), Optimal dynamic portfolio risk with ﬁrst-
order and second-order predictability, mimeo, University of
Toulouse.
19Ghysels, E., A.C. Harvey, and E. Renault, (1996), Stochastic
volatility, chapter 14 in G.S. Maddala and C.R. Rao (eds),
Handbook of Statistics, Vol. 14, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Kim, T.S., and E. Omberg, (1996), Dynamic nonmyopic portfolio
behavior, Review of Financial Studies,9 ,1 4 1 - 6 1 .
Kogan, L., and R. Uppal, (2000), Risk aversion and optimal
portfolio policie in partial and general equilibrium economies,
http://ﬁnance.commerce.ubc.ca/˜uppal/papers.html.
Merton, R.C., (1969), Lifetime portfolio selection under uncer-
tainty: The continuous- time case, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 51, pp. 247-257.
Mossin, J., (1968), Optimal multiperiod portfolio policies, Jour-
nal of Business, 215-229.
Leland, H.E., (1968), Savings and uncertainty: The precaution-
ary demand for savings, Quarterly Journal of Economics,4 5 ,
621-36.
Samuelson, P.A., (1963), Risk and uncertainty: the fallacy of the
Law of Large Numbers, Scientia, 98, 108-113.
Samuelson, P.A., (1969), Lifetime portfolio selection by dynamic
stochastic programming, Review of Economics and Statistics,
51, 239-246.
Samuelson, P.A., (1989), The judgement of economic science on
rationale portfolio management: indexing, timing, and long-
horizon eﬀects, Journal of Portfolio Management, Fall 1989,
3-12.
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, (1970), Increasing risk: I. A deﬁ-
nition, Journal of Economic Theory, 2, 225-243.
20CESifo Working Paper Series 




1329 Chiona Balfoussia and Mike Wickens, Macroeconomic Sources of Risk in the Term 
Structure, November 2004 
 
1330 Ludger Wößmann, The Effect Heterogeneity of Central Exams: Evidence from TIMSS, 
TIMSS-Repeat and PISA, November 2004 
 
1331 M. Hashem Pesaran, Estimation and Inference in Large Heterogeneous Panels with a 
Multifactor Error Structure, November 2004 
 
1332 Maarten C. W. Janssen, José Luis Moraga-González and Matthijs R. Wildenbeest, A 
Note on Costly Sequential Search and Oligopoly Pricing, November 2004 
 
1333 Martin Peitz and Patrick Waelbroeck, An Economist’s Guide to Digital Music, 
November 2004 
 
1335 Lutz Hendricks, Why Does Educational Attainment Differ Across U.S. States?, 
November 2004 
 
1336 Jay Pil Choi, Antitrust Analysis of Tying Arrangements, November 2004 
 
1337 Rafael Lalive, Jan C. van Ours and Josef Zweimueller, How Changes in Financial 
Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment, November 2004 
 
1338 Robert Woods, Fiscal Stabilisation and EMU, November 2004 
 
1339 Rainald Borck and Matthias Wrede, Political Economy of Commuting Subsidies, 
November 2004 
 
1340 Marcel Gérard, Combining Dutch Presumptive Capital Income Tax and US Qualified 
Intermediaries to Set Forth a New System of International Savings Taxation, November 
2004 
 
1341 Bruno S. Frey, Simon Luechinger and Alois Stutzer, Calculating Tragedy: Assessing the 
Costs of Terrorism, November 2004 
 
1342 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, A Backward Looking Measure of the Effective 
Marginal Tax Burden on Investment, November 2004 
 
1343 Heikki Kauppi, Erkki Koskela and Rune Stenbacka, Equilibrium Unemployment and 
Capital Intensity Under Product and Labor Market Imperfections, November 2004 
 
1344 Helge Berger and Till Müller, How Should Large and Small Countries Be Represented 
in a Currency Union?, November 2004 
 
1345 Bruno Jullien, Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries, November 2004  
1346 Wolfgang Eggert and Martin Kolmar, Contests with Size Effects, December 2004 
 
1347 Stefan Napel and Mika Widgrén, The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU 
Codecision, December 2004 
 
1348 Yin-Wong Cheung and Ulf G. Erlandsson, Exchange Rates and Markov Switching 
Dynamics, December 2004 
 
1349 Hartmut Egger and Peter Egger, Outsourcing and Trade in a Spatial World, December 
2004 
 
1350 Paul Belleflamme and Pierre M. Picard, Piracy and Competition, December 2004 
 
1351 Jon Strand, Public-Good Valuation and Intrafamily Allocation, December 2004 
 
1352 Michael Berlemann, Marcus Dittrich and Gunther Markwardt, The Value of Non-
Binding Announcements in Public Goods Experiments: Some Theory and Experimental 
Evidence, December 2004 
 
1353 Camille Cornand and Frank Heinemann, Optimal Degree of Public Information 
Dissemination, December 2004 
 
1354 Matteo Governatori and Sylvester Eijffinger, Fiscal and Monetary Interaction: The Role 
of Asymmetries of the Stability and Growth Pact in EMU, December 2004 
 
1355 Fred Ramb and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, Taxes and the Financial Structure of German 
Inward FDI, December 2004 
 
1356 José Luis Moraga-González and Jean-Marie Viaene, Dumping in Developing and 
Transition Economies, December 2004 
 
1357 Peter Friedrich, Anita Kaltschütz and Chang Woon Nam, Significance and 
Determination of Fees for Municipal Finance, December 2004 
 
1358 M. Hashem Pesaran and Paolo Zaffaroni, Model Averaging and Value-at-Risk Based 
Evaluation of Large Multi Asset Volatility Models for Risk Management, December 
2004 
 
1359 Fwu-Ranq Chang, Optimal Growth and Impatience: A Phase Diagram Analysis, 
December 2004 
 
1360 Elise S. Brezis and François Crouzet, The Role of Higher Education Institutions: 
Recruitment of Elites and Economic Growth, December 2004 
 
1361 B. Gabriela Mundaca and Jon Strand, A Risk Allocation Approach to Optimal 
Exchange Rate Policy, December 2004 
 
1362 Christa Hainz, Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy, December 2004 
 
  
1363 Jerome L. Stein, Optimal Debt and Equilibrium Exchange Rates in a Stochastic 
Environment: an Overview, December 2004 
 
1364 Frank Heinemann, Rosemarie Nagel and Peter Ockenfels, Measuring Strategic 
Uncertainty in Coordination Games, December 2004 
 
1365 José Luis Moraga-González and Jean-Marie Viaene, Anti-Dumping, Intra-Industry 
Trade and Quality Reversals, December 2004 
 
1366 Harry Grubert, Tax Credits, Source Rules, Trade and Electronic Commerce: Behavioral 
Margins and the Design of International Tax Systems, December 2004 
 
1367 Hans-Werner Sinn, EU Enlargement, Migration and the New Constitution, December 
2004 
 
1368 Josef Falkinger, Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large 
Societies, December 2004 
 
1369 Panu Poutvaara, Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate and 
Teaching to Stay?, December 2004 
 
1370 András Simonovits, Designing Benefit Rules for Flexible Retirement with or without 
Redistribution, December 2004 
 
1371 Antonis Adam, Macroeconomic Effects of Social Security Privatization in a Small 
Unionized Economy, December 2004 
 
1372 Andrew Hughes Hallett, Post-Thatcher Fiscal Strategies in the U.K.: An Interpretation, 
December 2004 
 
1373 Hendrik Hakenes and Martin Peitz, Umbrella Branding and the Provision of Quality, 
December 2004 
 
1374 Sascha O. Becker, Karolina Ekholm, Robert Jäckle and Marc-Andreas Mündler, 
Location Choice and Employment Decisions: A Comparison of German and Swedish 
Multinationals, January 2005 
 
1375 Christian Gollier, The Consumption-Based Determinants of the Term Structure of 
Discount Rates, January 2005 
 
1376 Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Jacob Engwerda, Joseph Plasmans, Bas van Aarle and 
Tomasz Michalak, Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies in the EMU: Spillovers, 
Asymmetries, and Institutions, January 2005 
 
1377 Luis H. R. Alvarez and Erkki Koskela, Progressive Taxation and Irreversible 
Investment under Uncertainty, January 2005 
 
1378 Theodore C. Bergstrom and John L. Hartman, Demographics and the Political 
Sustainability of Pay-as-you-go Social Security, January 2005 
  
1379 Bruno S. Frey and Margit Osterloh, Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats, 
January 2005 
 
1380 Oliver Hülsewig, Eric Mayer and Timo Wollmershäuser, Bank Loan Supply and 
Monetary Policy Transmission in Germany: An Assessment Based on Matching 
Impulse Responses, January 2005 
 
1381 Alessandro Balestrino and Umberto Galmarini, On the Redistributive Properties of 
Presumptive Taxation, January 2005 
 
1382 Christian Gollier, Optimal Illusions and Decisions under Risk, January 2005 
 
1383 Daniel Mejía and Marc St-Pierre, Unequal Opportunities and Human Capital Formation, 
January 2005 
 
1384 Luis H. R. Alvarez and Erkki Koskela, Optimal Harvesting under Resource Stock and 
Price Uncertainty, January 2005 
 
1385 Ruslan Lukach, Peter M. Kort and Joseph Plasmans, Optimal R&D Investment 
Strategies with Quantity Competition under the Threat of Superior Entry, January 2005 
 
1386 Alfred Greiner, Uwe Koeller and Willi Semmler, Testing Sustainability of German 
Fiscal Policy. Evidence for the Period 1960 – 2003, January 2005 
 
1387 Gebhard Kirchgässner and Tobias Schulz, Expected Closeness or Mobilisation: Why 
Do Voters Go to the Polls? Empirical Results for Switzerland, 1981 – 1999, January 
2005 
 
1388 Emanuele Bacchiocchi and Alessandro Missale, Managing Debt Stability, January 2005 
 
1389 Assar Lindbeck and Dirk Niepelt, Improving the SGP: Taxes and Delegation rather than 
Fines, January 2005 
 
1390 James J. Heckman and Dimitriy V. Masterov, Skill Policies for Scotland, January 2005 
 
1391 Emma Galli & Fabio Padovano, Sustainability and Determinants of Italian Public 
Deficits before and after Maastricht, January 2005 
 
1392 Angel de la Fuente and Juan Francisco Jimeno, The Private and Fiscal Returns to 
Schooling and the Effect of Public Policies on Private Incentives to Invest in Education: 
A General Framework and Some Results for the EU, January 2005 
 
1393 Juan C. Conesa and Carlos Garriga, Optimal Response to a Demographic Shock, 
January 2005 
 
1394 Christian Gollier, Optimal Portfolio Management for Individual Pension Plans, 
February 2005 